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KENmucxy LAW JouN[AL
CmmiNAL LAw-SEAac AND S URE-SEARCH OF AUToMoBmE INCI-
DENTAL TO LAWFUL ArmEST FOR TRAFrc VIOLATioN Is INVALM.-Ap-
pellant Cecil Lane was arrested for improper passing. He was then
removed to a police cruiser and questioned; thereafter one of the
officers returned to the car and made a search. The officer discovered
seven cases of whiskey in the trunk of the automobile. Lane was
convicted in Boyd County Court for transporting alcoholic beverages
for purpose of sale in dry territory.' He was convicted over his
motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search of
the automobile he was driving, but which was registered in his wife's
name. Held: Reversed. The mere fact of the legal arrest for a traffic
violation does not give the officer an absolute right to search the
vehicle. Secondly, a non-owner is entitled to have suppressed the
evidence obtained by reason of the search. Lane v. Commonwealth,
386 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1964).
The court cities the very early and leading case of Youman v. Com-
monwealth,2 for the principle that there is a broad constitutional
protection against unlawful search. In Youman, the court asserted
that no search can be made unless a search warrant has been issued,
or until the offender is lawfully arrested and the search is incidental
to that valid arrest. Lane concerns the latter situation. Youman further
asserts that a search made incidental to a valid arrest is lawful only
when made (1) to disarm, (2) to prevent escape, and (3) to prevent
the destruction of evidence connected with the offense. The problem
before the court in Lane was to determine whether the third justifica-
tion for lawful search incidental to a valid arrest is available at all in
the case of an arrest for improper passing. Clearly this third rule was
strictly construed by the Court of Appeals to provide the foundation
for the Lane decision. Significantly, this approach is a departure from
court policies in the interim between these two cases.3 Only eight
years after Youman, the Court of Appeals in Billings v. Common-
wealth4 upheld a search on a set of facts similar to the case at bar.
The court there stated, "it has been held uniformly ... that a warrant
is not necessary in order to render such discovery competent if made
as a result of a lawful arrest."
The cases between Youman and Lane seem to be more concerned
I Ky. Rev. Stat 242.230 provides: "No person in dry territory shall ...
transport for sale, barter or loan, directly or indirectly, any alcoholic beverage."
2 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
3 Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 807 Ky. 630, 211 S.W.2d 841 (1948); Settles
v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 403, 171 S.W.2d 999 (1943); Marsh v. Common-
wealth, 255 Ky. 484, 74 S.W.2d 943 (1934).
4223 Ky. 881, 3 S.W.2d 770 (1928).
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with the validity of the arrest than with the relationship of the purpose
of the arrest to the "fruits" of the search.
The court also cited the 1962 case of Commonwealth v. Mitchell
which contains the following statement:
Our decision may not be regarded as sanctioning the stopping of cars
for the ostensible or pretended purpose stated when in reality it is
actuated by an ulterior motive . . . or is done as a pretext or as a
subterfuge for circumventing the constitutional provisions against
searches.5
This statement indicates the court's concern with the scope of searches
made incidental to a valid arrest. The attitude of the Kentucky court
was amanifestation of the widespread judicial focus on this problem.
In Mapp v. Ohio,6 decided a few months before Mitchell, the Supreme
Court had called upon the state courts to give greater protection to the
individual against unlawful searches. Obviously, Mitchell paved the
way for the Court of Appeals' response to Mapp in its decision in Lane.
Lane is not a cure-all for future unlawful searches. In the present
case where bootleg whiskey was the product of the search the court
reached the only reasonable conclusion. But if Lane is to be meaning-
ful, it will have to stand the test of searches which reveal more legally
damaging evidence than illegal liquor. If the police, after making a
valid arrest for a traffic violation, search and seize counterfeiting plates,
stolen goods, or even a body in the automobile, will the court strictly
apply the rule that a search incidental to a valid arrest is lawful only
when made to prevent the destruction of evidence connected with that
offense?
Still, Lane is definitely another step towards protecting the basic
rights of every Kentucky citizen to be secure in his person, house,
papers and effects from unlawful search and seizure.7 As the Supreme
Court has said:
We meet in this case as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said that
if such arrest and search cannot be made, law enforcement will be more
difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers after consulting the lessons
of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a
too permeating police surveillance which they seemed to think was a
greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from
punishment.8
The extent of the court's concern with protecting personal rights
against unlawful search is further demonstrated by the resolution of
5:355 S.V.2d 686, 687 (Ky. 1962).
" 3 67 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ky. Const. § 10.
'United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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the second issue. In that regard, the court held that standing to object
to an unlawful search is not limited to the holder of a proprietary
interest.0
The court points out that previous cases, under the authority of
Gilliland v. Commonwealth,0 have held that only an owner may object
to an unlawful search. Gilliland involved two sons who controlled the
farm in the absence of their father. The sons were held to have the
proprietary interest necessary to object to a search for moonshining
equipment.
In a number of cases since Gilliland, the court had ruled certain
classes could not object. One who is not an owner could not object,"
nor a relative visiting the premises,w2 nor an automobile guest.13 But
in a 1950 case,14 the court upheld the standing of one accused and
convicted of operating a handbook whose ownership was not shown.
The court said, "not only did the defendant ... then claim to be in
charge of the premises, but has been in fact convicted of being in
charge of the place."15
The rationale for the standing requirement emanates from the
constitutional provisions of the fourth amendment. In Gilliland it was
said, "such provisions were adopted for the purpose of securing one's
right of unmolested privacy in his occupied premises and his freedom
from disturbances of his possession of articles and things."' 6 This
interpretation attempted to limit the right of the accused to claim
standing. That limitation persisted until the Lane decision.
Six months before Lane, the court in Brown v. Commonwealth17
said that an automobile guest, even where he is the driver, cannot
object to a search. The facts were similar to the present case except
that Locke, the one who had borrowed the car was a passenger while
Brown, the accused, was the driver. The court said that Locke, the
borrower was the only person who could object to the search. Brown
was cited in Lane but apparently without comment. Are the two cases
reconcilable? Did the Court of Appeals simply impute to Lane that
proprietary interest which Locke was held to possess in Brown, or is
9 Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Ky. 1964).
10224 Ky. 453, 6 S.W.2d 467 (1928).
lPowell v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1955); Lewis v. Com-
monwealth, 242 Ky. 628, 47 S.W.2d 66 (1932).
12 Smith v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1964); Combs v. Com-
monwealth, 841 S.W.2d 774 (Ky. 1960).
13 Brown v. Commonwealth, 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964); Pruitt v. Com-
monwealth, 286 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. 1955).
14 Willoughby v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 291, 231 S.W.2d 79 (1950).
'1 231 S.W.2d at 81.
16 6 S.W.2d at 468.
17 378 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1964).
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there an alternative? It is suggested that there is an alternative: Where
Brown and Gilliland sought to limit the right to object, based on a
certain proprietary interest, Lane has extended that right to anyone
legally in the searched automobile. In support of this new rule, the
court cites Jones v. United States where it was said:
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone
legitimately on the premises where a search occurs may challenge its
legality by way of a motion to suppress.' 8
In conclusion, Lane stands for two major propositions in Kentucky
criminal law:
(1) A general search cannot be made incidental to an arrest
for a traffic violation;
(2) Standing may be invoked by anyone lawfully in the auto-
mobile.
The real import of Lane however may be even greater than these
announced rules. In reading the opinion, one feels a new determina-
tion on the part of the court to afford greater protection for the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Robert F. Barrett
18362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
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